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Abstract
The idea of approximate entailment has been proposed in [13] as a way of modeling
the reasoning of an agent with limited resources. They proposed a system in which
a family of logics, parameterized by a set of propositional letters, approximates
classical logic as the size of the set increases.
In this paper, we take the idea further, extending two of their systems to deal
with full propositional logic, giving them semantics and sound and complete proof
methods based on tableaux. We then present a more general system of which the
two previous systems are particular cases and show how it can be used to formalize
heuristics used in theorem proving.
Keywords: Automated Reasoning, Deductive Systems, Approximate Reasoning,
Non-classical Logics, Knowledge Representation.
1 Introduction
Logic has been used in several areas of Articial Intelligence as a tool for
representing knowledge as well as a tool for modeling agents' reasoning. Ideal
agents know all the logical consequences of their beliefs. However, real agents
are limited in their capabilities. Due to these limitations, a real rational agent
must devise some strategy to make good use of the available resources.
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In this work we propose a general framework for modeling limited rea-
soning, and show two systems which are special cases of the more general
framework. Our system is based on Cadoli and Schaerf's approximate en-
tailment [13]. Their method consists in dening dierent logics for which
satisability is easier to compute than classical logic and treat these logics as
upper and lower bounds for the classical problem. In [13], these approximate
logics are dened by means of valuation semantics and algorithms for test-
ing satisability. The language they use is restricted to that of clauses, i.e.,
negation appears only in the scope of atoms and there is no implication.
Our starting point here is their family of logics S
3
. S
3
is a family of logics
parameterized by a set S of relevant propositions. These logics approximate
classical logic (CL) in the following sense. Let P be a set of propositions and
S
0
 S
1
 : : :  P; let Th(L) indicate the set of theorems of a logic. Then,
by means of successive approximations:
Th(S
3
(;))  Th(S
3
(S
0
))  Th(S
3
(S
1
))  : : :  Th(S
3
(P))
where Th(S
3
(P)) = Th(CL) is the set of classical theorems. From this prop-
erty, we see that it suÆces to prove a result in some S
3
-approximation to have
a classically valid theorem.
Approximate entailment has been used to formalize approximate diagnosis
[15] and belief revision [5]. However, the knowledge had to be encoded in
clausal form. It happens that each approximation step is characterized by a
formal logic. The nal step of the approximations is classical logic, in which
every formula is equivalent to one in clausal form. However, in none of the
intermediate systems such equivalence holds.
The original system has been extended to deal with full propositional logic
in [10]. In this paper, we extend another system, S

3
, which was introduced in
[4]. We provide a proof method based on tableaux for extended S

3
and then
show that both S
3
and S

3
are particular cases of a system that we call S
e
.
We provide semantics and a tableaux method for S
e
. We then show how this
general system can be used to formalize dierent heuristics used in theorem
proving.
Most proofs are omitted due to space limitations.
Notation: Let P be a countable set of propositional letters. We concen-
trate on the classical propositional language L
C
formed by the usual boolean
connectives ! (implication), ^ (conjunction), _ (disjunction) and : (nega-
tion).
Throughout the paper, we use lowercase Latin letters to denote proposi-
tional letters, lowercase Greek letters to denote formulas, and uppercase letters
(Greek or Latin) to denote sets of formulas.
Let S  P be a nite set of propositional letters. We abuse notation and
write that, for any formula  2 L
C
,  2 S if all its propositional letters are
in S. A propositional valuation v
p
is a function v
p
: P ! f0; 1g.
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2 The Family S
3
In this section, we rst present Cadoli and Schaerf's system S
3
and then the
extended version that deals with full propositional logic.
Schaerf and Cadoli [13] dene two approximations of classical entailment:
j=
1
S
which is complete but not sound, and j=
3
S
which is classically sound but
incomplete. These approximations are carried out over a set of atoms S  P
which determines their closeness to classical entailment. Here we will concen-
trate only in the latter, namely the S
3
family of logics.
In the trivial extreme of S
3
approximate entailment, i.e., when S = P,
classical entailment is obtained. At the other extreme, j=
3
;
corresponds to
Levesque's logic for explicit beliefs [12], which bears a connection to Relevance
Logics such as those of Anderson and Belnap [1].
In an S
3
assignment, if p 2 S, then p and :p get opposite truth values,
while if p 62 S, p and :p do not both get 0, but may both get 1. The name
S
3
comes from the possible truth assignments for literals outside S. If p 62 S,
there are three possible S
3
assignments, the two classical ones, assigning p and
:p opposite truth values, and an extra one, making them both true. The set
of formulas for which we are testing entailments is assumed to be in clausal
form.
Formally, the semantics of the logic S
3
(S) over clauses is constructed by
dening an S
3
-valuation of literals into f0; 1g such that:

v
3
S
(:p) = 1 i v
3
S
(p) = 0, if p 2 S.

if p 62 S, we can have one of 3 possibilities:
 v
3
S
(:p) = 1 and v
3
S
(p) = 0
 v
3
S
(:p) = 0 and v
3
S
(p) = 1
 v
3
S
(:p) = v
3
S
(p) = 1
This valuation can be generalized simply to clauses. By varying S, we
generate a family of logics. Also, satisability, validity and entailment are
dened in the usual way.
Although in classical logic any formula is equivalent to one in clausal
form, the usual transformation does not preserve truth-values under the non-
standard S
3
semantics. The S
3
family of logics has been extended to proposi-
tional formula in [10], where a sound and complete incremental proof system
for it was also provided.
The generalized semantics for S
3
is the following:
Denition 2.1 An S
3
-valuation v
3
S
is a function, v
3
S
: L
C
! f0; 1g, that ex-
tends a propositional valuation v
p
(i.e., v
3
S
(p) = v
p
(p)), satisfying the following
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restrictions:
(i) v
3
S
( ^ ) = 1 , v
3
S
() = v
3
S
() = 1
(ii) v
3
S
( _ ) = 0 , v
3
S
() = v
3
S
() = 0
(iii) v
3
S
(! ) = 0 , v
3
S
() = 1 and
v
3
S
() = 0
(iv) v
3
S
(:) = 0 ) v
3
S
() = 1
(v) v
3
S
(:) = 1;  2 S ) v
3
S
() = 0
Rules (i){(iii) are exactly those of classical logic. Rules (iv) and (v) restrict
the semantics of negation: rule (iv) states that if v
3
S
(:) = 0, then negation
behaves classically and forces v
3
S
() = 1; rule (v) states that if v
3
S
(:) = 1,
negation must behave classically only if  2 S. Formulas outside S may
behave classically or paraconsistently, i.e., both the formula and its negation
may be assigned the truth value 1.
Note that an S
3
-valuation is not uniquely dened by the propositional
valuation it extends. This is due to the fact that if  62 S and v
3
S
() = 1, the
value of v
3
S
(:) can be either 0, in which case  has a classical behavior, or 1,
in which case  behaves paraconsistently. A comparison between S
3
semantics
and axiomatization and da Costa's Paraconsistent Logic C
1
was done in [9].
We dene a formula  to be S-valid in S
3
if v
3
S
() = 1 for any S
3
-valuation.
A formula is S-satisable in S
3
if there is at least one v
3
S
such that v
3
S
() = 1.
The S
3
-entailment relationship between a set of formulas   and a formula 
is represented as
  j=
3
S

and holds if every valuation v
3
S
that simultaneously satises all formulas in  
also satises . A formula is S-valid if it is entailed by ;, represented as j=
3
S
.
An inference system for the full logic S
3
based on the KE-tableau method-
ology was developed in [10] and further developed in [11]. KE-tableaux were
introduced by D'Agostino [7] as a principled computational improvement over
Smullyan's Semantic Tableaux [14], and have since been successfully applied
to a variety of logics [6,2,3].
KE-tableaux deal with T - and F -signed formulas. An expansion of a
tableau is allowed when the premises of an expansion rule are present in a
branch; the expansion consists of adding the conclusions of the rule to the end
of all branches passing through the set of all premises of that rule.
For each connective, there are at least one T - and one F -linear expansion
rules. Linear expansion rules always have a main premise, and may also have
an auxiliary premise. They may have one or two consequences. The only
branching rule is the Principle of Bivalence, stating that a formula has to be
either true of false. Figure 1 shows KE-tableau expansion rules for the family
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S
3
.
T ! 
T 
T 
(T !
1
)
T ! 
F 
F 
(T !
2
)
F ! 
T 
F 
(F !)
F  ^ 
T 
F 
(F^
1
)
F  ^ 
T 
F 
(F^
2
)
T  ^ 
T 
T 
(T^)
T  _ 
F 
T 
(T_
1
)
T  _ 
F 
T 
(T_
2
)
F  _ 
F 
F 
(F_)
T :
F 
(T:) provided  2 S
F :
T 
(F:)
T  F 
(PB)
Fig. 1. KE-rules for S
3
The only way in which such a tableau system diers from a classical one
is in the (T :) rule, which comes with a proviso:
T :
F 
provided that  2 S
The meaning of this rule is that the expansion of a branch is only allowed
if it contains the rule's antecedent and the proviso is satised, that is, the
formula in question belongs to S. This rule is actually a restriction of the
classical rule, stating that if  62 S the (T :)-rule cannot be applied. Let us
call the system thus obtained KES
3
.
This makes our system immediately subclassical, for any tableau that
closes for KES
3
also closes for classical logic. So any theorems we prove in
KES
3
are also classical theorems.
So KES
3
is correct and incomplete with respect to classical logic. In fact,
KES
3
is complete and correct with respect to the semantics above.
Theorem 2.2 ([10]) 
1
; : : : ; 
n
j=
3
S
 i any possible KES
3
tableau for 
1
;
: : : ; 
n
`  closes. Furthermore, if one S
3
tableau for 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  closes,
any such tableau closes.
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3 The Dual Family S

3
Cadoli and Schaerf in a subsequent work [4] have proposed a dual family of
logics which they called S

3
. An S

3
-valuation of literals into f0; 1g such that:

v
3
S
(:p) = 1 i v
3
S
(p) = 0, if p 2 S.

if p 62 S, we can have one of 3 possibilities:
 v
3
S
(:p) = 1 and v
3
S
(p) = 0
 v
3
S
(:p) = 0 and v
3
S
(p) = 1
 v
3
S
(:p) = v
3
S
(p) = 0
Only this last line diers from the previous S
3
family, in that for an atom
p 62 S, both p and :p may be false. As a result, in such a logic, the formula p_
:p is not valid for p 62 S, which characterizes such logics as paracomplete. This
logic was presented in [4] with the same setting as S
3
was presented: formulas
in clausal form only (in fact, negation normal form was also accepted); no
extension to full logic; no proof theory.
In an analogous way to our extension of S
3
, we extend here S

3
to full
propositional logic.
Denition 3.1 An S

3
-valuation v
3
S
is a function, v
3
S
: L
C
! f0; 1g, that
extends a propositional valuation v
p
(i.e., v
3
S
(p) = v
p
(p)), satisfying the fol-
lowing restrictions:
(i) v
3
S
( ^ ) = 1 , v
3
S
() = v
3
S
() = 1
(ii) v
3
S
( _ ) = 0 , v
3
S
() = v
3
S
() = 0
(iii) v
3
S
(! ) = 0 , v
3
S
() = 1 and
v
3
S
() = 0
(iv) v
3
S
(:) = 0;  2 S ) v
3
S
() = 1
(v) v
3
S
(:) = 1 ) v
3
S
() = 0
The denition of S

3
-logical consequence, j=
3
S
is totally analogous to that of
j=
3
S
.
Also, in an analogous way, we dene a KE-tableau proof system for the
S-parameterized family of logics S

3
. The rules for the connectives !, ^ and
_ are the same as in S
3
(which are the same as the classical rules). The rules
for negation are now:
T :
F 
and
F :
T 
provided that  2 S
The rule (T :) is the classical one, while (F :) comes with a proviso. This
is dual to the situation in S
3
.
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As an example we illustrate two tableaux. The rst one is the principle
of contradiction, p;:p ` q, which was not a theorem in paraconsistent S
3
but is now a theorem in S

3
. The second example is the principle of excluded
middle ` p _ :p, which was a theorem in S
3
, but which is not a theorem in
paracomplete S

3
.
T p
T :p
F q
F p

F p _ :p
F p
F :p
{
In the rst tableau, we simply apply (T :) to the second line to close the
tableau. In the second tableau, we would want to apply (F :), but since we
consider S = ;, the proviso precludes us from doing that, and the tableau
remains open.
We have the following soundness and completeness result for KES

3
tableaux.
Theorem 3.2 
1
; : : : ; 
n
j=
3
S
 i any possible KES

3
tableau for 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`
 closes. Furthermore, if one S

3
tableau for 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  closes, any such
tableau closes.
From the way KES

3
was built, it is clear that it is also an approximation
of classical logic from below. Also, it appears that S
3
and S

3
are incom-
patible families, due to the following properties, that come straight from the
denitions of v
3
S
and v
3
S
.
Lemma 3.3 For  62 S:
(a) In S
3
, if v
3
S
() = 1, then v
3
S
(:) may be either 0 or 1.
(b) In S

3
, if v
3
S
() = 1, then v
3
S
(:) = 0.
(c) In S

3
, if v
3
S
() = 0, then v
3
S
(:) may be either 0 or 1.
(d) In S
3
, if v
3
S
() = 0, then v
3
S
(:) = 1 .
However, as we are going to see, this does not consist in any kind of
incompatibility, and we may have systems that obey both rules.
If we concentrate on both tableau methods that approximate classical logic
from below, we see that both consist of a restriction of one rule in a classical
tableaux.
It turns out that constructing a proof theoretical approximation of classical
logic is a trivial task!
Creating a Family that Approximates Classical Logic. It suÆces
that one restricts the use of one (or a set of) rules of one's favorite proof
method to a limited set a formulas, in a way that eventually the rule will
be applicable to all classical formulas.
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The hard bit, however, is to nd a corresponding semantics for such a sys-
tem. In the following, we show all the possibilities of approximating classical
logic from below by restricting the KE-tableau method, and provide it with a
generic semantics as well.
4 A Generalized Approximation Inference
We have seen how to restrict (T:) in KES
3
and how to restrict the use of (F:)
in KES

3
. We assumed that the parameter set S governing both approxima-
tions was the same, but since there was no interactions between the S
3
-rule
and the S

3
rule, this assumption has no consequences. Now, we are going for
greater generality, and we assume dierent context sets for each rule. This
gives us a system where every connective behaves classically only for formulas
which belong to the corresponding context set: S
T
^
, S
F
^
, S
T
_
, S
F
_
, S
T
!
, S
F
!
, S
T
:
and S
F
:
.
An initial step towards this generalization was given in in [11], with a
system that dealt with S
T
:
and S
T
!
.
We present a generalization of the KE-tableaux, that we call KES
e
, that
deals with context sets for all the tableau rules. The system is obtained by
adding restrictions to each expansion rule, as illustrated in Figure 2.
T ! 
T 
T  if  2 S
T
!
(T !
1
)
T ! 
F 
F  if  2 S
T
!
(T !
2
)
F ! 
T  if  2 S
F
!
F  if  2 S
F
!
(F !)
F  ^ 
T 
F  if  2 S
F
^
(F^
1
)
F  ^ 
T 
F  if  2 S
F
^
(F^
2
)
T  ^ 
T  if  2 S
T
^
T  if  2 S
T
^
(T^)
T  _ 
F 
T  if  2 S
T
_
(T_
1
)
T  _ 
F 
T  if  2 S
T
_
(T_
2
)
F  _ 
F  if  2 S
F
_
F  if  2 S
F
_
(F_)
T :
F  if  2 S
T
:
(T:)
F :
T  if  2 S
F
:
(F:)
T  F 
(PB)
Fig. 2. KE-rules for the generalized system
Lemma 4.1 KES
e
can simulate the dynamic evolution of both KES
3
and
KES

3
.
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Proof. To see that KES
e
can simulate the dynamic evolution of KES
3
, it
suÆces to set S = S
T
:
and all other S parameters to the full set of propositional
letters. In practice, this amounts to lifting the proviso of all rules except for
the (T:) rule. Similarly for KES

3
. 2
As usual, we want our system to be based on a sound and complete sub-
classical semantics
4.1 Semantics for Generalized Approximate Inference
Denition 4.2 An S
e
-valuation v
e
S
is a function, v
e
S
: L
C
! f0; 1g, that ex-
tends a propositional valuation v
p
(i.e., v
e
S
(p) = v
p
(p)), satisfying the following
restrictions:
(^
1
) v
e
S
( ^ ) = 1;  2 S
T
^
) v
e
S
() = 1
(^
2
) v
e
S
( ^ ) = 1;  2 S
T
^
) v
e
S
() = 1
(^
3
) v
e
S
( ^ ) = 0; v
e
S
() = 1;  2 S
F
^
) v
e
S
() = 0
(^
4
) v
e
S
( ^ ) = 0; v
e
S
() = 1;  2 S
F
^
) v
e
S
() = 0
(_
1
) v
e
S
( _ ) = 0;  2 S
F
_
) v
e
S
() = 0
(_
2
) v
e
S
( _ ) = 0;  2 S
F
_
) v
e
S
() = 0
(_
3
) v
e
S
( _ ) = 1; v
e
S
() = 0;  2 S
T
_
) v
e
S
() = 1
(_
4
) v
e
S
( _ ) = 1; v
e
S
() = 0;  2 S
T
_
) v
e
S
() = 1
(!
1
) v
e
S
(! ) = 0;  2 S
F
!
) v
e
S
() = 1
(!
2
) v
e
S
(! ) = 0;  2 S
F
!
) v
e
S
() = 0
(!
3
) v
e
S
(! ) = 1; v
e
S
() = 1;  2 S
T
!
) v
e
S
() = 1
(!
4
) v
e
S
(! ) = 1; v
e
S
() = 0;  2 S
T
!
) v
e
S
() = 0
(:
1
) v
e
S
(:) = 0;  2 S
F
:
) v
e
S
() = 1
(:
2
) v
e
S
(:) = 1;  2 S
T
:
) v
e
S
() = 0
It is easy to see that the semantics of S
3
is a particular case of the sys-
tem above, where the sets S
T
^
, S
F
^
, S
T
_
, S
F
_
, S
T
!
, S
F
!
, and S
F
:
contain all the
propositional letters of the language and S = S
T
:
. Similarly, the semantics of
S

3
corresponds to S = S
F
:
and S
T
^
= S
F
^
= S
T
_
= S
F
_
= S
T
!
= S
F
!
= S
T
:
= P.
4.2 Soundness and Completeness
We say that KES
e
is sound with respect to the S
e
semantics if whenever a
tableau closes for an input sequent, then the sequent's antecedent formulas
entail its consequent in S
e
. Conversely, the KES
e
-tableau method is complete
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with respect to the S
e
semantics if for all sequents such that the the antecedent
entails the consequent in S
e
, all KES
e
-tableaux close.
We extend an S
e
-valuation to signed formulas making v
e
S
(T) = 1 i
v
e
S
() = 1 and v
e
S
(F) = 1 i v
e
S
() = 0. A valuation satises a branch
in a tableau if it simultaneously satises all the signed formulas in the branch.
To prove soundness, we rst show the correctness of all linear expansion
rules of KES
e
.
Lemma 4.3 If the antecedents of the KES
e
linear expansion rules are S-
satised in S
e
by v
e
S
so are its conclusions.
Lemma 4.4 If a branch is satised by a valuation v
e
S
prior to the application
of PB, then at least one of the two branches generated is satised by a valuation
v
e
S
after the application of PB.
Theorem 4.5 (Soundness) Suppose a tableau for 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  closes.
Then 
1
; : : : ; 
n
j=
e
S
.
Proof. We show the contrapositive. So suppose 
1
; : : : ; 
n
6j=
e
S
, so there
is a valuation v
e
S
such that v
e
S
(
1
) = : : : = v
e
S
(
1
) = 1 and v
e
S
() = 0.
In this case, the initial tableau for 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  is such that all formulas
T 
1
; : : : ; T 
n
; F  are satised by v
e
S
.
By Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4, we see that each application of an expansion rule
preserves at least one satisable branch. As closed branches are not satisable,
at least one branch remains open and the tableau cannot close. 2
We say that a branch of a tableau is complete if there are no more appli-
cable expansion rules.
Lemma 4.6 An open complete branch in a KES
e
-tableau is S-satisable in
S
e
.
Theorem 4.7 (Completeness) If 
1
; : : : ; 
n
j=
e
S
 then any possible KES
e
tableau for 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`  closes.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there is a tableau for 
1
; : : : ; 
n
`
 with an open complete branch B. Then by Lemma 4.6 there is an S
e
valuation that satises B, which includes T 
1
; : : : ; T 
n
; F , contradicting

1
; : : : ; 
n
j=
e
S
. 2
4.3 Applications of S
e
We examine here the use of S
e
as a formalization of proof strategies using
KE-tableaux. In a tableau expansion, more than one rule may be applicable
at a time, and the choice of which rule to use may have dramatic eects, for
a short proof may exist but the wrong choice of rule application may lead to
an explosion in the number of branches.
Let X 2 fT; Fg and  2 f^;_;!;:g. The use of an S
X

context set in
KES
e
-tableaux may lead to a delay in using the rule (X). This works as
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follows: suppose the rule (X) is classically applicable at one point in the
branch expansion, but the corresponding proviso,  2 S
X

, is not met at that
point. The use of the rule (X) is then blocked. All other applicable rules
would take precedence, and will be applied. After their application, there are
two possibilities: either all branches passing through that (X)-blocked point
are closed, in which case there is nothing to be done, or there is at least one
open branch. In the latter case, the formula  is inserted in S
X

, the logic is
changed to one \closer" to classical logic, from S
e
(S
X

) to S
e
(S
X

[ fg), so
that the proviso is now met. The expansion of the tableau can then proceed
incrementally in the new logic, without having to restart from square 1.
In the systems S
3
and S

3
we have seen that most of the sets S
X

were equal
to P. So the choice of which set S
X

to be chosen to be dierent from P has
to do with which rule application we want to postpone.
Clearly, we do not want to postpone the application of one-premised linear
rules. These rules, which correspond to the -rules in Smullyan's analytic
tableaux, never generate a new branch and are all commutative, for the appli-
cation of one rule does not invalidade the application of another. This means
that for theorem proving purposes we would want to have
S
F
!
= S
T
^
= S
F
_
= S
T
:
= S
F
:
= P
Note that the context sets of S
3
and S

3
are included in the sets above
that we want to maintain xed in P. In fact, this is in accordance to some
experiments made in [8] with the implementation of KES
3
tableaux, in which
a decrease in performance was noted from the use of KES
3
strategy in re-
spect to classical KE in which the one-premised rules were given application
precedence, as above.
The two-premised rules are normally associated with the branching pro-
cess, which is the important point to concentrate on when trying to reduce the
size of a proof. There are two premises in those rules. The main premise is the
main formula, which in Smullyan's analytic tableaux are associated to -rules
and the branching process. The other premise is the auxiliary formula, which
is associated with the KE branching heuristics. According to such heuristics,
given a main formula of a two-premised rule where the auxiliary formula is
absent, one should branch using PB so as to generate, in one of the branches,
the missing auxiliary formula.
As a result, a strategy for tableau branching based on S
e
should keep track
of the formulas in the context sets S
F
^
; S
T
_
and S
T
!
.
The resulting strategy goes in accordance with the general intuition of
tableau expansion: rst expand the formulas that do not generate new branches,
and only then expand the branching rules. Furthermore, our new strategy now
places further restrictions on the branching rule, for we are giving preference
to branch over a formula that is already on one of the sets S
F
^
; S
T
_
and S
T
!
.
That is, our strategy gives preference for branching over subformulas of for-
mulas over which there has already occurred a branching operation higher up
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in the tableau.
Example 4.8 In this example we will consider S = S
F
^
= S
T
_
= S
T
!
. That
is, if there is a branching over some formula, subsequent branches over sub-
formulas of it will be privileged. This strategy is good if there are irrelevant
formulas, for it helps to avoid using them for the branching heuristics.
To see that, consider the sequent
A; (A! B)_(A! C); ((A^B_C) ! D)_(A^(B_C) ! E); (G^F )!
(B _ C) ` D _ E
which generates, with initially S = ;, the initial tableau
1: T A
2: T (A! B) _ (A! C)
3: T (A ^ (B _ C)! D) _ (A ^ (B _ C)! E)
4: T (G ^ F )! (B _ C)
5: F D _ E
Note that line 4 is totally irrelevant to the proof, and we want to avoid using
it. After the rst expansion of line 5 into
6: F D (F_)5
7: F E (F_)5
we have a choice of lines 2, 3 and 4 over which to apply the branching heuris-
tics. As all those lines are T -marked, we choose a formula that has some atoms
in common with the F -marked formulas in tableau; this justiable, for the F -
marked formulas are those we are trying to prove, and so we chose formulas
that are relevant to the goal.
This choice leads to a branch over 3, with branching formulas F A ^ (B _
C)! D and T A ^ (B _ C)! D. The left-hand branch develops as follows:
8a: F A ^ (B _ C)! D
9a: T A ^(B _C) !E (T_) 3; 8a S := fA;B;C;Dg
10a: T A ^ (B _ C) (F !) 8a
11a: T E (T !) 9a; 10a

In line 9a, the use of (T_) using 3 as main premise and 8a as auxiliary premise
forces the insertion of all atoms of 8a into S. Since S = S
F
^
= S
T
_
= S
T
!
, this
new S allows the use of (T !) to obtain line 12a, which closes the branch
with line 7.
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On the right-hand branch, we obtain the following expansion:
8b: T A ^ (B _ C)! D
9b: F A ^ (B _ C) (T !) 8b; 6
10b: F (B _ C) (F^) 9b; 1
11b: F B (F_) 10b
12b: F C (F_) 10b
The fact that B;C 2 S licenses the use on (T !) in line 9b; similarly, A 2 S
licenses (F^) in line 10b. At this point we have to branch over lines 2 or 4.
But 4 is blocked, for some of its atoms are outside A, which does not occur
with line 2. So the expansion proceeds branching over A! B.
13ba: T A! B 13bb: F A! B
14ba: T B (T !) 13ba; 1 14bb: T A! C (T_) 2; 13bb
 15bb: T C (T !) 14bb; 1

As all branches are closed, the tableau is proved in S
e
and also in classical
logic.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have extended the system S

3
[4] to deal with full propositional
logic, obtaining a family of paracomplete logics which is dual to the family of
paraconsistent logics S
3
. Comparing the semantics and proof methods of both
systems, we noted that the idea behind those systems, namely restricting the
application of a rule, could be further generalized. This generalization gave us
the system S
e
, for which we gave a semantic and a sound and complete proof
method. We then showed how S
e
can be used to formalize dierent heuristics
used for theorem proving.
Future work includes extending the implementation of the theorem prover
for KE and KES
3
to KES
e
and testing it extensively with dierent context
sets.
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